At the heart of science is an essential tension between two seemingly contradictory attitudes — an openness to new ideas, no matter how bizarre or counterintuitive they may be, and the most ruthless skeptical scrutiny of all ideas, old and new. This is how deep truths are winnowed from deep nonsense. In broad strokes, cognitive science examines mental life, including perception, attention, memory, reasoning, language, and related functions. As an example, consider a brief scenario depicting the beginning of a typical day: A young woman is awakened by her alarm at While considering these topics, she also appreciates her surroundings, noticing trees and birds, and following her usual morning route.
She happily notes that someone removed a sandwich wrapper that so interested her dog yesterday. Upon seeing an unfamiliar car in a numbered parking spot, she wonders whether new neighbors have moved in downstairs. After showering, she stands in her closet, sipping coffee and considering potential outfits, while a song runs through her head. Realizing that time is growing short, she quickly selects jeans and a sweater, and then hurries off to work.
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Although simplified and schematic, the foregoing example captures the essence of cognitive life: The mind is constantly perceiving visual, auditory, and tactile stimuli. Objects are reflexively categorized as chairs, clouds, or toothpaste. Attention waxes and wanes, sometimes focusing on the outside world but often shifting to an inner train of thought.
All the while, thoughts and behaviors are guided by memory, such as knowing what you are doing next. Language is pervasive in cognitive life: Even when not engaged in conversation or reading, watching TV, etc. Such experiences typify the automatic, constant life of the mind. Beyond this loose classification, all her behaviors share another similarity: None can be plausibly explained, or even meaningfully addressed, by the principles of embodied cognition.
Everyone knows that mind and body are deeply connected. While watching a potential home run sailing perilously close to foul territory, the entire crowd bends sideways in unison, expressing their hopes via posture.
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People explore the environment with constant head and eye movements, gather information from touch, and fluently use tools as extensions of their limbs. People with expertise in specific skills whether athletic, surgical, etc. Thinking about emotional topics can increase heart rate and temperature. In more cognitive terms, physical needs e. Engaging mental imagery for an action activates the premotor and motor cortices of the brain, which then affect muscle tension in the limbs that were imagined. When people hold their hands near visible objects, attention toward those objects is systematically altered e.
There are many examples of bodily states affecting cognition, and cognitive states affecting the body. A more dramatic example comes from the ability of baseball outfielders to chase and catch fly balls. A baseball in flight follows a parabolic trajectory, affected by numerous variables e. Despite these challenges, fly balls are governed by constant principles. Saxberg a , b theorized that outfielders can assess key flight parameters by observing the early moments of fly balls, using them to predict where the ball will land. This proposed solution was not attractive for several reasons.
For example, distance from home plate to the outfield would make precise visual assessment nearly impossible, and the angle of flight relative to the observer could systematically warp perception. In contrast to this computational approach, more elegant heuristic solutions were proposed, requiring only perception and action.
By doing so, the outfielder will intercept the ball.
By either strategy, the outfielder uses perceptual information to guide locomotion and uses locomotion to hold the perceptual information constant. Such a tight coupling of perception and action is consistent with premises from ecological psychology e. The challenge of face to photo-ID matching. The faces and licenses shown with fabricated names and addresses match in half of the examples, mismatching in the other half.
The answers are provided in Footnote 2. The present article offers a critique of EC, taking a different approach, relative to prior critiques that examine one specific domain in detail. For example, imagine that an EC proponent conducts a study, finding that perception of action-related words e. Thus, rather than assume that 1 word perception leads to 2 motor priming, the causal chain is reversed, such that 1 motor simulation of the word kick leads to 2 perceptual appreciation of the word itself.
Given this strong and counterintuitive theoretical interpretation, researchers with different theoretical perspectives can be expected to critically evaluate the study, asking whether the evidence truly merits such an elaborate account. For example, Mahon and Caramazza considered numerous experiments and claims about embodied language processing and its neural bases and found little compelling evidence for an EC account. This begins a cycle wherein experiments are parametrically extended, theories are challenged, and points and counterpoints are published.
Such cycles are often fruitful in science, and can sustain research for years. However, they also induce tunnel vision — theoretical debates zoom in on specific phenomena while broader assumptions are rarely examined. Having such empirical domains is beneficial, as they foster concrete debate. Problems can arise, however, because strong theoretical claims may appear reasonable when confined to specific domains but appear deeply flawed when extended to broader analysis.
To preview, we argue that EC is theoretically vacuous with respect to nearly all cognitive phenomena.
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We also argue that the principles of EC are often 1 co-opted from other sources, such as evolution; 2 vague, such that model building is not feasible; 3 trivially true, offering little new insight; and, occasionally, 4 nonsensical. In fairness, some cognitive phenomena e. Consider first Skinner's use of the notions stimulus and response. A typical example of stimulus control for Skinner would be the response to a piece of music with the utterance Mozart or to a painting with the response Dutch. Suppose instead of saying Dutch , we had said Clashes with the wallpaper , I thought you liked abstract work , Never saw it before , Tilted , Hanging too low , Beautiful , Hideous , Remember our camping trip last summer?
Skinner could only say that each of these responses is under the control of some other stimulus property of the physical object. If we look at a red chair and say red , the response is under the control of the stimulus redness ; if we say chair , it is under the control of [… chairness ]. This device is as simple as it is empty. The word stimulus has lost all objectivity in this usage. Stimuli are no longer part of the outside physical world; they are driven back into the organism. It is clear from such examples, which abound, that the talk of stimulus control simply disguises a complete retreat to mentalistic psychology.
In the present article, we first identify the core ideas that characterize EC. Relative to us, however, Chomsky had one clear advantage beyond his sense of style.
Whereas Skinner was clear and explicit about the principles of behaviorism, attempting to distill the principles of embodied cognition is quite challenging. Reading the literature on EC can be a vexing experience. Instead, all cognitive experiences are necessarily grounded in the sensory and motor contexts of their occurrence.
Sensorimotor information critically shapes conceptual representations and, during online cognition, those same sensorimotor codes actively shape processing. According to PST, during perception, people register multimodal perceptual, motor, and introspective states. Later, when similar perceptual information is processed, these representations are reactivated i.
The most exciting idea in cognitive science right now is the theory that cognition is embodied. Our bodies and their perceptually guided motions through the world do much of the work required to achieve our goals, replacing the need for complex internal mental representations. This stance from Wilson and Golonka reflects their focus on ecological psychology. As discussed with respect to catching fly balls, there are certain problems that can be elegantly solved with minimal cognitive mediation, at least in theory.
Such problems usually require a person or animal to move through space, to wield objects, and so on. If we ask someone to throw a grapefruit at a distant target, no amount of thinking e. Based on such phenomena, some EC theorists have generalized, arguing that cognition writ large is achieved without representations. As we note below, and as others have argued e. Wilson, , this claim quickly fails when the vast majority of cognitive life is considered. For example, it would be exceedingly challenging to recall that Bill Murray starred in Groundhog Day without some stored representation of the movie.
In preview, the fundamental tenet of embodied cognition research is that thinking is not something that is divorced from the body; instead, thinking is an activity strongly influenced by the body and the brain interacting with the environment.
To say it differently, how we think depends on the sorts of bodies we have. Furthermore, the reason why cognition depends on the body is becoming clear: Cognition exists to guide action. We perceive in order to act and what we perceive depends on how we intend to act ; we have emotions to guide action; and understanding even the most abstract cognitive processes e.
This concern for action contrasts with standard cognitive psychology that, for the most part, considers action and the body as secondary to cognition. This quote conveys several core themes of EC. Everyone surely agrees that cognition cannot occur without a living body, that a person cannot see an object without directing her eyes at it, and that cognitive functions will vary in response to biological factors such as fatigue, hunger, and inebriation. Thus, we articulate the basic claim of embodiment as follows: When a person processes information e.
For example, when viewing a coffee cup, perception is fundamentally shaped by the presence of a handle that can be grasped e. Or, when hearing a sentence describing some action e. Thus, the most important theme is that 1 cognitive processing is influenced by the body. This theme from ecological psychology arises repeatedly in the EC literature.
For example, a person can only see objects in her immediate surroundings, which is trivially true and offers no insight. The claim is this: The forces that drive cognitive activity do not reside solely inside the head of the individual, but instead are distributed across the individual and the situation as they interact. Therefore, to understand cognition we must study the situation and the situated cognizer together as a single, unified system.
Wilson found this hypothesis problematic and logically flawed.